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DISPARITIES IN POSTCONVICTION 
REMEDIES FOR THOSE WHO PLEAD 
GUILTY AND THOSE CONVICTED AT 
TRIAL: A SURVEY OF STATE STATUTES 





On November 19, 1991, a fourteen-year-old girl named Cateresa 
Matthews went missing in her hometown of Dixmoor, Illinois.
1
  A few 
weeks later, her body was found in a nearby field; she had been sexually 
assaulted and died from a gunshot wound to the mouth.
2
  In late October 
and early November 1992, police arrested five suspects, all between the 
ages of fourteen and sixteen, named Robert Taylor, Robert Lee Veal, 
Jonathan Barr, James Harden, and Shainne Sharp—a group that later came 
to be known as the “Dixmoor Five.”3  After lengthy interrogations by 
police, three of the teens confessed to the crime, each implicating the five 
teens who were ultimately charged.
4
  During the pretrial investigation, DNA 
testing was conducted on sperm recovered from the victim’s body; the 
results excluded all five of the teenagers.  Regardless, the State continued to 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013.  I owe much, much 
gratitude to Stuart Chanen and Professor Joshua Tepfer for inspiring the topic of this 
Comment and for their many insights and suggestions.  I would also like to thank the 
editorial staff of JCLC for their feedback and assistance, especially Jessica Notebaert, Megan 
Lawson, and Elie Zenner. 
1 Steve Mills & Andy Grimm, After Years in Prison, Men Cleared of Dixmoor Crime, 
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2011, § 1, at 12. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Background on Englewood and Dixmoor Cases, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF 
YOUTH, http://www.cwcy.org/englewood_dixmoor.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
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press charges against all five suspects.
5
 
Two of the teens—Robert Veal and Shainne Sharp—agreed to plead 
guilty and testify against the other three in exchange for shorter sentences.
6
  
The other three were convicted after trials, and each was sentenced to at 
least eighty years in prison.
7
  Both Veal and Sharp have since recanted their 
testimony, confessions, and statements implicating the other three men.
8
 
In November 1994, thirty-year-old Nina Glover was found naked and 
strangled to death in a dumpster in the Englewood neighborhood of 
Chicago’s South Side.9  Four months later, a tip allegedly led police to 
investigate five teenagers in the murder—Terrill Swift, Harold Richardson, 
Michael Saunders, Vincent Thames, and Jerry Fincher.
10
  After intense, 
hours-long interrogations, during which the teenagers were not 
accompanied by counsel or allowed to speak to family members, police said 
that all five had confessed to raping and killing the woman, although there 
were major factual discrepancies in their statements.
11
  Semen was 
identified on samples collected from the victim’s body and an early form of 
DNA testing was conducted, excluding all five suspects as possible 
contributors.  Despite this evidence, the prosecutors went forward with the 
trials.
12
  Though it is unclear why the prosecutors continued with the trials 
after the only physical evidence from the crime excluded all five of the 
teenagers, later statements by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office 
(CCSAO) indicated that the prosecutors felt that the confessions alone were 
strong enough evidence of the teenagers’ guilt.13  
Three defendants—Terrill Swift, Harold Richardson, and Michael 







10 Id.; see also Meet the Exonerated: Vincent Thames, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/ilthamesvSummary.htm
l (last visited February 26, 2013). 
11 Background on Englewood and Dixmoor Cases, supra note 4. 
12 Id. 
13 See Erica Goode, When DNA Evidence Suggests ‘Innocent,’ Some Prosecutors Cling 
to ‘Maybe,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2011, at A19 (quoting State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez, 
“DNA evidence in and of itself is not always the ‘silver bullet’ that it is sometimes perceived 
to be”); see also Jason Meisner, Exonerations Urged for 7 Convicted in ’90s, CHI. TRIB., 
Oct. 1, 2011, §1, at 4 (quoting a CCSAO spokesperson, “DNA evidence is not always in and 
of itself the factor that would lead to the dismissal or filing of charges”). 
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sentenced to prison terms ranging from thirty to forty years.  A fourth, 
Vincent Thames, after seeing two of the others convicted at trial and 
sentenced to lengthy prison terms, pleaded guilty and received a thirty-year 
sentence.
14
  These four men later became known as the “Englewood 
Four.”15  The fifth defendant’s confession was suppressed and prosecutors 
dropped the charges against him.
16
  All five of the men claimed their 
confessions were coerced and false and have since maintained their 
innocence. 
In the state of Illinois, those who plead guilty are barred from later 
seeking DNA testing on the evidence in their cases.
17
  As a result, Robert 
Veal and Shainne Sharp from the Dixmoor case and Vincent Thames from 
the Englewood case had no way to prove their innocence.  However, in 
2011, their codefendants who were convicted at trial successfully petitioned 
courts to have relevant DNA evidence retested and run through the 
Combined DNA Index System to see if a match could be found.
18
  In each 
case, the DNA was found to match a violent, career criminal.  In the 
Dixmoor case, the DNA matched a man who already had one rape 
conviction, and in the Englewood case, the DNA matched a man who had 
already been convicted of one murder and charged in another after his DNA 
was found on each of the victims’ bodies.19 
In each case, the defendants who had lost at trial quickly filed motions 
to vacate their convictions.
20
  However, in both cases the State argued that 
the defendants who pleaded guilty were barred from participating in those 
postconviction proceedings.
21
  While the Illinois postconviction statute does 
not explicitly bar individuals who plead guilty from filing postconviction 
petitions, prosecutors argued that because the DNA testing statute has been 
interpreted as excluding those who plead guilty from petitioning the court 
 
14 Petition for Certificate of Innocence at 4, People v. Thames, No. 95 CR 09676-02 (Cir. 
Ct. Ill. June 5, 2012). 
15 See Background on Englewood and Dixmoor Cases, supra note 4. 
16 Id. 
17 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (LexisNexis 2012); People v. O’Connell, 879 
N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 2007). 
18 Background on Englewood and Dixmoor Cases, supra note 4. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 People’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Joint Motion for Relief from Judgment Pursuant 
to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 at 14–15, People v. Thames, No. 95CR-15660 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Sept. 14, 
2011); People’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Relief from Judgment of Conviction Pursuant 
to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 at 4, People v. Veal, No. 93CR-7347 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Aug. 5, 2011) 
[hereinafter People’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Relief]. 
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for forensic testing, the postconviction statute providing relief from 
judgments should also be interpreted as barring them from filing motions 
for postconviction relief.
22
  Prosecutors further argued that those who 
pleaded guilty should not be able to “bootstrap” their claims onto the claims 
of the other men.
23
 
The Dixmoor Five and Englewood Four cases were before two 
different judges, and the two judges interpreted the statute in conflicting 
ways.  In September 2011, the Dixmoor Five case was argued before Judge 
Michelle Simmons, who ultimately agreed with the State’s arguments and 
dismissed Robert Lee Veal’s postconviction petition, holding that, as a 
result of his guilty plea, he was barred from the postconviction proceedings 
to which his codefendants who went to trial were entitled.
24
  Ultimately, on 
November 3, 2011, the CCSAO formally requested that Judge Simmons 
vacate the convictions of the Dixmoor Five and to nolle prosequi future 
charges.
25
  Judge Simmons entered an order vacating the convictions of the 
three codefendants who went to trial and, a little while later, also vacated 




However, in the Englewood Four case, the judge reached a different 
conclusion.  On October 10, 2011, attorneys for the Englewood Four and 
the State argued their respective motions before Judge Paul Biebel Jr., 
Presiding Judge of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook 
County.  On November 16, 2011, Judge Biebel issued a written decision 
holding that those who plead guilty are “not barred from seeking relief 
pursuant to Section 2-1401,” the Illinois statute establishing a process by 
which a defendant may seek relief from a judicial order more than thirty 
days after its entry.
27




As demonstrated by the Dixmoor Five and Englewood Four cases, the 
 
22 People’s Motion to Dismiss Petition for Relief, supra note 21.  Some of the author’s 
familiarity with the Dixmoor and Englewood cases comes from her work in the Center on 
Wrongful Convictions of Youth at Northwestern University School of Law. 
23 Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, People v. Veal, No. 93CR-7347 (Cir. Ct. Ill. Sept. 
23, 2011). 
24 Id. at 37–38. 
25 James Harden, Jonathan Barr, and Robert Taylor’s Joint Petition for Certificates of 
Innocence at 7, People v. Harden et al., Nos. 92CR-27247 & 95CR-23475 (Cir. Ct. Ill. June 
6, 2012). 
26 Id. 
27 Order at 5, People v. Thames et al., No. 95CR-9676 (Nov. 16, 2011). 
28 Id. 
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law in Illinois governing postconviction remedies for those who plead 
guilty is unclear and has been interpreted in different and conflicting ways.  
The postconviction laws in other states are equally diverse and unclear with 
regard to those who plead guilty.
29
  Part II of this Comment analyzes the 
postconviction remedies available in all fifty states, including access to 
DNA or other forensic testing and general postconviction remedies, and 
considers how those who plead guilty are treated differently from those who 
were convicted at trial.  Part III argues that to treat those who plead guilty 
differently from those who are convicted at trial is inherently unjust.  
Finally, Part IV provides legislative recommendations to ensure that all 
people are treated equally in the postconviction context and given 
opportunities to demonstrate their innocence. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Generally, there are three main types of postconviction remedies 
governed by state statute—DNA or other forensic testing, general 
postconviction remedies, and habeas corpus petitions.  For the purposes of 
this Comment, “DNA or other forensic testing” refers to the ability of 
someone who has been found guilty of a crime to petition on his own behalf 
for forensic testing of DNA or other evidence related to the crime he was 
charged with.  “General postconviction remedies” are procedures through 
which a prisoner requests a court to vacate or correct a conviction or 
sentence.
30
  These include, but are not limited to, the ability of someone 
who has been convicted of a crime to petition on her own behalf to correct 
errors of fact or law in her underlying conviction, allege ineffective 
assistance of counsel, or bring new evidence to the attention of the trial 
court.  “Habeas corpus” refers to the ability of someone who has been 
convicted of a crime to petition the court for a writ to ensure that his or her 
imprisonment or detention is not illegal.
31
 
A. DNA OR OTHER FORENSIC TESTING 
Currently the District of Columbia and all states besides Oklahoma 
have statutes covering the postconviction right to DNA or other forensic 
testing.
32
  The laws granting postconviction petitioners the right to request 
 
29 See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of State Statutes and Rules Governing Requests for Postconviction DNA Testing, 
72 A.L.R. 6TH 227 (2012). 
30 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1204 (8th ed. 2004). 
31 See id. at 728. 
32 Buckman, supra note 29, § 2; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 
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DNA or other forensic testing vary significantly among the states,
33
 and 
most state statutes do not directly address the issue of whether people who 
pleaded guilty can apply to have the evidence from their cases tested.
34
  
While some states explicitly grant guilty pleaders the right to apply for 
DNA or other forensic testing,
35
 others explicitly exclude those who plead 
guilty from utilizing these provisions.
36
  Other states place different 
limitations on postconviction DNA or other forensic testing, such as time 
barriers, extra requirements for those who plead guilty, or testing for only 
certain categories of cases.
37
  The remaining states leave open the question 
 
MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1673 (2008) (providing an overview of postconviction DNA testing 
statutes for those who claim they were wrongfully convicted); Michael P. Luongo, Note, 
Post-Conviction Due Process Right to Access DNA Evidence: Dist. Attorney’s Office v. 
Osborne, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 127, 134 (2010).  Massachusetts recently 
passed a postconviction DNA testing statute, Senate Bill 1987, on February 17, 2012.  2012 
Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 38 (West). 
33 See sources cited supra note 32. 
34 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis 2011) (“An individual convicted of a 
capital offense who is serving a term of imprisonment or awaiting execution of a sentence of 
death, through written motion to the circuit court that entered the judgment of sentence, may 
apply for the performance of forensic . . . (DNA) testing on specific evidence . . .”); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2001) (“At any time, a person who was convicted of and 
sentenced for a felony offense and who meets the requirements of this section may request 
the forensic . . . [DNA] testing of any evidence . . . .”). 
35 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2011) (“[T]he right to file a motion for 
postconviction DNA testing provided by this section is absolute and shall not be waived. 
This prohibition applies to, but is not limited to, a waiver that is given as part of an 
agreement resulting in a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 
(West 2008) (“The court shall grant the motion if . . . [t]he evidence subject to DNA analysis 
is material to . . . evidence . . . admitted to at a guilty plea proceeding.”). 
36 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.72 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (“An offender 
is not an eligible offender under division (C)(1) of this section regarding any offense to 
which the offender pleaded guilty or no contest.”). 
37 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (2003 & Supp. 2011) (“A person who 
has been convicted of and sentenced for a crime under the laws of this State that carries the 
potential punishment of imprisonment of at least one year and for which the person is in 
actual execution of either a pre-Maine Criminal Code sentence of imprisonment, including 
parole, or a sentencing alternative pursuant to Title 17-A, section 1152, subsection 2 that 
includes a term of imprisonment or is subject to a sentence of imprisonment that is to be 
served in the future because another sentence must be served first may . . . mov[e] the court 
to order DNA analysis of evidence.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.690 (2011) (“A person may file 
in the circuit court in which the judgment of conviction was entered a motion requesting the 
performance of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) testing on specific evidence if the person: (1) 
Is incarcerated in a Department of Corrections institution as the result of a conviction for 
aggravated murder or a person felony as defined in the rules of the Oregon Criminal Justice 
Commission; or (2) Is not in custody but has been convicted of aggravated murder, murder 
or a sex crime as defined in ORS 181.594.”). 
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of whether guilty pleaders can apply for DNA or forensic testing; however, 
some use language regarding trials that could imply that the remedy was 
meant to be limited solely to those who pleaded not guilty and were 
convicted by a jury.
38
 
1. States Granting Those Who Plead Guilty the Right to  
DNA or Other Forensic Testing 
Currently, thirteen states and the District of Columbia explicitly grant 
those who plead guilty the right to DNA or other forensic testing after the 
guilty plea is entered.
39
  The California and West Virginia statutes provide 
that the right to file a motion for postconviction DNA testing is absolute 
and may not be waived, thus barring prosecutors from including provisions 
in plea agreements that would prevent those who plead guilty from later 
petitioning for DNA testing.
40
  Other statutes allow those who plead guilty 
to apply for DNA testing because of the effect that exculpatory DNA results 
might have had on the defendants’ decisions to plead guilty.41  The Texas 
statute, which requires any applicant for DNA testing to demonstrate that 
the perpetrator’s identity was at issue in the underlying conviction, states 
that courts are prohibited from finding that identity was not at issue solely 
based on a defendant’s guilty plea.42  The remaining statutes simply contain 
language including those who plead guilty as a category of individuals who 
have the right to apply for DNA testing.
43
  In 2012, Massachusetts enacted 
 
38 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2101, §§ 29-4119–25 (2008) (“[A] person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a court may, at any time after conviction, file a motion, with or 
without supporting affidavits, in the court that entered the judgment requesting forensic 
DNA testing of any biological material . . . .”). 
39 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2011); D.C. CODE §§ 22-4133, 22-4135 
(LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 844D-121 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. §§ 19-4901–02 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 (West 2008); 2012 Mass. Legis. 
Serv. ch. 38 (West); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-1–29 (2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 547.035 
(West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651-D:1–5 (LexisNexis 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31-1A-2 (2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 64.01–05 (West 2007); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14 (LexisNexis 2012); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 974.02, 974.06, 974.07 (West 2011). 
40 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14 
(LexisNexis 2012). 
41 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 (West 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2 (2010). 
42 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01–05 (West 2007). 
43 See D.C. CODE §§ 22-4133, 22-4135 (LexisNexis 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 844D-121–133 (LexisNexis 2012); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-4901–02 (2004); MISS. 
CODE ANN. §§ 99-39-1–29 (2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 547.035 (West 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 651-D:1–5 (LexisNexis 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2008); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 15-2B-14 (LexisNexis 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 974.02, 974.06, 974.07 (West 
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its postconviction DNA and forensic testing statute.
44
  As the bill was being 
considered, some district attorneys called the bill “flawed” because it 
allowed those who plead guilty to apply for postconviction DNA testing.
45
  
However, on February 12, 2012, the bill was signed into law, and in its final 
form it explicitly states that “[a] person who pleaded guilty or nolo 
contendere in the underlying case may file a motion” for DNA testing.46 
Despite not explicitly addressing the issue in its postconviction DNA 
testing statute,
47
 Kansas has also granted those who plead guilty the right to 
petition for DNA testing.  In State v. Smith, the Court of Appeals of Kansas 
overturned the District Court’s decision to deny DNA testing to a man 
convicted of rape and sodomy on the sole basis of his guilty plea.
48
  
Acknowledging that the purpose of the state’s DNA testing statute was to 
“determine if one who is in state custody was ‘wrongfully convicted or 
sentenced’ and if so, to vacate and set aside the judgment,” the court stated 
that to deny all people who plead guilty the ability to apply for DNA testing 
would be inconsistent with the broad legislative goals underlying the 
statute.
49
   
2. States Denying Those Who Plead Guilty the Right to DNA or Other 
Forensic Testing 
Currently, Ohio is the only state whose statute explicitly denies those 
who plead guilty the right to DNA testing.
50
  Initially, the statute allowed 
inmates who pleaded guilty to a crime that occurred prior to the enactment 
of the statute to apply for forensic testing as long as the prosecuting 
attorney agreed,
51
 but in 2007 the Supreme Court of Ohio deemed that 
provision unconstitutional.
52
  As the law stands today, no one who pleads 
 
2011). 
44 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 38 (West). 
45 Marc Larocque, Post-Conviction DNA Testing Proposal Stirs Debate Among 
Advocates, DAs, HERALD NEWS (Nov. 27, 2011, 12:20 AM), http://www.heraldnews.com/ 
news/x143555067/Post-conviction-DNA-testing-proposal-stirs-debate-among-advocates-
DAs. 
46 2012 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 38 (West).  
47 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2001). 
48 State v. Smith, 119 P.3d 679, 684 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005). 
49 Id. at 683 (quoting State v. Denney, 101 P.3d 1257, 1265 (Kan. 2004)). 
50 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.72A(11) (West 2005) (providing that “[a]n offender 
is not an eligible offender [to apply for DNA testing] regarding any offense to which the 
offender pleaded guilty or no contest”). 
51 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.82 (West 2005). 
52 State v. Sterling, 864 N.E.2d 630, 636 (Ohio 2007). 
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guilty is eligible to apply for DNA testing. 
In addition to Ohio’s explicit statutory exclusion of guilty pleaders 
from DNA testing, courts in Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania have 
also interpreted their respective DNA testing statutes as excluding those 
who plead guilty.
53
  The Illinois statute does not explicitly restrict those 
who plead guilty from applying for DNA testing.  Instead, it lays out 
several statutory requirements that must be met in order for DNA testing to 
be granted: identity must have been at issue in the trial resulting in the 
defendant’s conviction and the test results must have the scientific potential 
to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the 
defendant’s assertion of actual innocence.54 
In People v. Urioste, the Illinois Appellate Court interpreted these 
requirements as indicating a legislative intent to allow postconviction 
forensic testing only in those cases “where such testing could discover new 
evidence at sharp odds with a previously rendered guilty verdict based upon 
criminal acts that the defendant denied having engaged in.”55  The court 
went on to note that the “legislature did not want convicted defendants who 
admitted at their trial to the commission of the acts charged, and did not 
contest the question of who committed those acts, to make a mockery of the 
criminal justice system and the statute’s grace.”56  In People v. Lamming, 
the Illinois Appellate Court took this analysis a step further, holding that 
because the defendant in that case pleaded guilty, “he did not have a trial, 
he did not deny committing the acts charged, and identity was not at 
issue.”57  Therefore, to allow him (or those who plead guilty in general) 
access to forensic testing would be inconsistent with legislative intent.
58
  In 
2007, the Illinois Supreme Court spoke definitively on this issue, holding 
that “defendants who plead guilty may not avail themselves of [the 
postconviction DNA testing statute].”59 
Taking a similar approach, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
interpreted the Pennsylvania forensic testing statute as precluding those 
 
53 See People v. O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 320 (Ill. 2007); People v. Lamming, 833 
N.E.2d 925, 927 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); People v. Urioste, 736 N.E.2d 706, 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2000); People v. Byrdsong, 820 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (App. Div. 2006); Williams v. Erie Cnty. 
Dist. Attorney’s Office, 848 A.2d 967, 972 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 
54 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (LexisNexis 2012). 
55 Urioste, 736 N.E.2d at 712. 
56 Id. 
57 Lamming, 833 N.E.2d at 928. 
58 Id. 
59 People v. O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 2007). 
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who plead guilty from later seeking DNA testing.
60
  The court reasoned that 
because the statute requires the applicant to demonstrate that the identity of 
the perpetrator was at issue in the proceedings that led to conviction, an 
applicant who pleaded guilty would not be able to meet the requirements of 
a prima facie case.
61
  In addition, the court interpreted the plain meaning of 
“proceedings,” as used by the statute, as not encompassing “negotiations 
between the prosecution and defense regarding plea bargains.”62 
Similarly, the New York statute does not explicitly address whether 
those who plead guilty may petition for DNA or forensic testing.
63
  In 
People v. Byrdsong, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme 
Court held that defendants who plead guilty are not entitled to DNA testing 
because the statute’s references to “trial” indicate a legislative intent to 
extend the remedy only those defendants who were convicted by a jury.
64 
3. States Placing Other Limitations on Who May  
Apply for Forensic Testing 
Some states place limitations on who may apply for DNA or other 
forensic testing without specifically including or excluding petitioners 
based solely on the issue of whether they pleaded guilty.
65
  Two states—
Virginia and Wyoming—currently require those who plead guilty to follow 
a separate procedure from those convicted at trial if they wish to apply for 
postconviction DNA testing.
66
  Virginia’s statute allows those who plead 
guilty to apply for DNA testing, but once they receive exculpatory results, 
some petitioners who plead guilty are barred from applying for a writ of 
 




63 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (McKinney 2006) (providing that “[w]here the 
defendant’s motion requests the performance of a forensic DNA test on specified evidence, 
and upon the court’s determination that any evidence containing . . . (“DNA”) was secured in 
connection with the trial resulting in the judgment, the court shall grant the application for 
forensic DNA testing of such evidence upon its determination that if a DNA test had been 
conducted on such evidence, and if the results had been admitted in the trial resulting in the 
judgment, there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more 
favorable to the defendant”). 
64 People v. Byrdsong, 820 N.Y.S.2d 296, 299 (App. Div. 2006). 
65 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010) (limiting access to forensic testing for 
defendants who “did not admit or concede guilt”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 6-232, 
8-201 (LexisNexis 2007) (limiting access to forensic testing by type of crime). 
66 See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A) (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-12-302–15 
(2011). 
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actual innocence and must instead apply for executive relief, such as a 
pardon.
67
  In Wyoming, individuals who pleaded guilty prior to January 1, 
2000, may petition for DNA testing, but in cases where a guilty plea 
occurred after January 1, 2000, courts may not order DNA testing unless 
they find that the failure to exercise due diligence in requesting DNA 




Currently, ten states require anyone petitioning for postconviction 
DNA testing to demonstrate that the identity of the perpetrator was at issue 
in the proceedings that led to conviction.
69
  However, the states do not agree 
on whether the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty means that identity 
was not at issue.  For example, as discussed above, Illinois courts have 
determined that once a defendant pleads guilty, identity is no longer an 
issue.
70
  On the other hand, the Texas forensic testing statute states that “the 
convicting court is prohibited from finding that identity was not an issue in 
the case solely on the basis of [a guilty] plea, confession, or admission, as 
applicable.”71 
In the remaining states that require identity to be at issue, it is not clear 
how this requirement affects those who plead guilty.  For example, South 
Dakota permits forensic testing if the defendant meets a list of conditions, 
including: “If the petitioner was convicted following a trial, the identity of 
the perpetrator was at issue in the trial.”72  The statute is silent as to whether 
those who plead guilty are able to obtain DNA testing, but this provision 
could be read to suggest that the legislature also intended the statute to 
apply to guilty pleaders, who need not demonstrate that identity was at issue 
in order to file a petition for forensic testing. 
Many state statutes use language that could be interpreted as requiring 
 
67 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-327.1, 19.2-327.2 (2008).  While anyone who pleads not 
guilty may be issued a writ of actual innocence, for those who plead guilty, the writ of actual 
innocence is only available in Class 1 or 2 felony cases, or felony cases for which the 
maximum penalty is imprisonment for life.  VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.2 (2008). 
68 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-303(d) (2011). 
69 See GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41 (West 2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 
(LexisNexis 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.16 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 590.01–06 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-21-110, 46-21-111 (2011); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-15 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31-1A-2 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-1 (2004); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
arts. 64.01–05 (West 2007). 
70 People v. O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Ill. 2007). 
71 TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(b) (West 2007). 
72 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-1 (2004). 
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a trial to have taken place in order for someone to petition for forensic 
testing.
73
  As discussed above, the Illinois statute includes language 
referring to the “trial court,” “time of trial,” and “in the trial which resulted 
in his or her conviction,” and Illinois courts have interpreted this as 
indicating a legislative intent to allow DNA testing only for those who were 
convicted after a trial.
74
 
Other state statutes also include references to trial, but courts have yet 
to decide whether those statutes exclude those who plead guilty.  For 
example, the Alabama forensic testing statute provides that an individual 
convicted of a capital offense may apply for DNA testing of specific 
evidence if such testing was not performed “at the time of the initial trial” 
and if “the identity of the perpetrator was at issue in the trial that resulted in 
the conviction of the petitioner.”75  The Arizona, Delaware, and Louisiana 
forensic testing statutes also include references to trial.
76 
A confession may also bar postconviction DNA testing; in Alaska and 
Pennsylvania, petitioners who make certain types of admissions are 
ineligible to seek later DNA testing.
77
  In Alaska, defendants cannot apply 
for postconviction DNA testing if they “admit[ted] or concede[d] guilt 
under oath in an official proceeding for the offense that was the basis of the 
conviction,” but “the court, in the interest of justice, may waive this 
requirement,” and “the entry of a guilty or nolo contendere plea is not an 
admission or concession of guilt.”78 
Some states only allow postconviction DNA testing in cases where the 
 
73 See ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 
(LexisNexis 2012); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1 (2006). 
74 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (LexisNexis 2012); O’Connell, 879 N.E.2d at 
319. 
75 ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (LexisNexis 2006). 
76 The Arizona statute allows a petitioner to apply for DNA testing if a reasonable 
probability exists that “[t]he petitioner’s verdict or sentence would have been more favorable 
if the results of [DNA] testing had been available at the trial leading to the judgment of 
conviction.”  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2010).  The Delaware statute allows a 
motion for DNA testing to be granted if “[t]he testing is to be performed on evidence secured 
in relation to the trial which resulted in the conviction.”  DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 
(2011).  In Louisiana, petitioners must include in their applications for testing “[a] factual 
explanation of why there is an articulable doubt, based on competent evidence whether or 
not introduced at trial, as to the guilt of the petitioner.”  LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
926.1(1) (2006). 
77 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543.1 (2011).  Note that 
Pennsylvania already bars those who plead guilty from postconviction DNA testing.  42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 9543.1(c)(3)(ii). 
78 ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010). 
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underlying conviction is for certain categories or types of crimes.  The 
Florida, Louisiana, and Nevada forensic testing statutes allow DNA testing 
only in felony cases.
79
  The Kansas statute allows postconviction DNA 
testing only in murder and rape cases, and the Oregon statute provides for 
postconviction DNA testing only in aggravated murder, murder, or sex 
crime cases.
80
  The Kentucky statute allows DNA testing in cases where a 
person was convicted of and sentenced to death for a capital offense.
81
  The 
Maryland and South Carolina statutes also provide a list of eligible offenses 
for postconviction DNA testing.
82
  In Maine, a person convicted of a crime 
that “carries the potential punishment of imprisonment of at least one year” 
may apply for DNA testing.
83
  Further, many states seem to limit DNA 
testing to cases in criminal courts, excluding juveniles whose cases were 
adjudicated in juvenile courts.
84 
B. GENERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES 
Most states have statutes that govern the procedures and remedies 
through which defendants can pursue claims regarding constitutional 
violations, errors of fact in the underlying proceedings, changes in law since 
the conviction occurred, and other issues.
85
  Only a handful of states’ 
statutes explicitly address whether those who plead guilty have access to 
these remedies;
86
 most states leave it to the courts to determine whether 
those who plead guilty can file postconviction petitions.  While most states 
allow those who plead guilty to file postconviction petitions, either by 
 
79 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 925.11, 925.12, 943.3251 (West 1998); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 926.1 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.0918 (LexisNexis 2010); FLA. R. CRIM. 
P. 3.853. 
80 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.690 (2011). 
81 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.176, 422.285, 422.287 (LexisNexis 2009). 
82 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 6-232, 8-20 (LexisNexis 2007) (as amended by S.B. 
211, 2008 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008)); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-30 (2009). 
83 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2137 (2003 & Supp. 2011). 
84 Joshua A. Tepfer & Laura H. Nirider, Adjudicated Juveniles and Collateral Relief, 64 
ME. L. REV. 554, 559–60 (2012). 
85 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-4901–11 (2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/122-
1 et seq. (LexisNexis 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9543–51 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 
78B-9-101–405 (LexisNexis 2009); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 1629 (2008) (providing an overview of postconviction remedies for those 
who claim they were wrongfully convicted). 
86 See D.C. CODE § 22-4135 (LexisNexis 2001); MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 43-21-651, 99-39-
5 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-104, 78B-9-402 
(LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(a)(8); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.850. 
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statute or by case law, some states provide limitations for those who plead 
guilty
87
 or allow individuals to waive their postconviction rights as part of a 
plea agreement.
88
  Overall, most statutes are not explicit about the rights of 
those who plead guilty, so much of the postconviction law governing those 
who plead guilty is left open for the courts to determine. 
1. States Explicitly Including Those Who Plead Guilty in Their 
Postconviction Statutes or Case Law 
Only six states and the District of Columbia explicitly include those 
who plead guilty in their postconviction statutes.
89
  Alaska’s statute 
provides that “[a] person who has been convicted of or sentenced for a 
crime may institute a proceeding for postconviction relief . . . if the person 
claims . . . that the applicant should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere in order to correct manifest injustice.”90  Arizona’s 
postconviction statute states that “[a]ny person who pled guilty or no 
contest . . . shall have the right to file a postconviction relief proceeding,”91 
and in State v. Ward, the Court of Appeals of Arizona noted that for 
defendants who plead guilty, proceedings for postconviction relief are the 
only means available for exercising their rights to appellate review.
92
  Both 
the Washington, D.C., and Utah statutes also explicitly give those who 
plead guilty the right to petition the court to set aside their guilty pleas on 




87 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.3(d) (West 2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 
(2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-1 (2011); ALA. R. CRIM. P. 32.2. 
88 See DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2000); Willett v. State, 993 
S.W.2d 929, 929 (Ark. 1999); State v. Valdez, 851 S.W.2d 20, 21–22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); 
State v. Downs, 631 S.E.2d 79, 84–85 (S.C. 2006). 
89 See D.C. CODE § 22-4135 (LexisNexis 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-641, 99-39-
5 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-9-104, 78B-9-402 
(LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(a)(8); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 
3.850. 
90 ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(a)(8). 
91 ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 32.1 
92 State v. Ward, 118 P.3d 1122, 1124–25, 1126 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). 
93 In Washington, D.C., “[a] person convicted of a criminal offense . . . may move the 
court to vacate the conviction or to grant a new trial on grounds of actual innocence based on 
new evidence” by setting forth specific facts “[e]stablishing how that evidence demonstrates 
that the movant is actually innocent despite having been convicted at trial or having pled 
guilty.”  D.C. CODE § 22-4135 (LexisNexis 2001).  The Utah postconviction statute provides 
that “[i]f the conviction for which the petitioner asserts factual innocence was based upon a 
plea of guilty, the petition shall contain the specific nature and content of the evidence that 
establishes factual innocence.”  UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-402 (LexisNexis 2009). 
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Though the majority of states’ statutes do not explicitly grant those 
who plead guilty access to postconviction remedies, courts in most states 
allow those who plead guilty to bring postconviction petitions under the 
same statutes as those who are convicted at trial.
94 
2. States Placing Limitations on Access to Postconviction  
Remedies for Those Who Plead Guilty 
Several states give those who plead guilty limited access to 
postconviction remedies, or access that depends on the issue being raised.
95
   
For example, the Rhode Island postconviction statute allows a petitioner to 
bring a postconviction petition alleging that constitutional violations 
occurred, the court lacked jurisdiction, his sentence was in violation of the 
law, there are newly discovered facts, or any other violation of the law 
occurred.
96
  In Miguel v. State, however, the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island stated that “[t]he sole focus of an application for post-conviction 
relief filed by an applicant who has pled guilty is ‘the nature of counsel’s 
advice concerning the plea and the voluntariness of the plea.  If the plea is 
validly entered, we do not consider any alleged prior constitutional 
infirmity.’”97 
 
94 See, e.g., Connally v. State, 33 So. 3d 618, 620–21 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007); Graham v. 
State, 188 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Ark. 2004); People v. Kirk, 221 P.3d 63, 64–65 (Colo. App. 
2009); Odiaga v. State, 950 P.2d 1254, 1255–56 (Idaho 1997); Newton v. State, 456 N.E.2d 
736, 740 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Johnson v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000548-MR, 2008 
WL 4270731, at *3–4 (Ky. Sept. 18, 2008); Diep v. State, 748 A.2d 974, 976 (Me. 2000); 
Commonwealth v. Fanelli, 590 N.E.2d 186, 188 (Mass. 1992); State v. Coe, 188 N.W.2d 
421, 422 (Minn. 1971); State v. Dunster, 707 N.W.2d 412, 414–15 (Neb. 2005); Hart v. 
State, 1 P.3d 969, 971 (Nev. 2000). 
95 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 770.3 (West 2006); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2011); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-1 (2011).  People who plead guilty may also lose out on appellate 
rights that those who went to trial would receive.  For example, Michigan’s postconviction 
statute grants individuals convicted of a felony or misdemeanor at trial an automatic right to 
appeal, but states that “[a]ll appeals from final orders and judgments based upon pleas of 
guilty or nolo contendere shall be by application for leave to appeal.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 770.3(1)(d) (West 2006).  This means that defendants who plead guilty do not have 
an automatic right to appeal and an appellate court decides whether or not to hear the case.  
Bulger v. Curtis, 328 F. Supp. 2d 692, 698 (E.D. Mich. 2004).  When several state judges 
denied appellate counsel to indigent defendants and the Michigan legislature codified this 
practice by statute, the constitutionality of this statute was challenged.  Id. at 692.  A United 
States District Court found the categorical denial of counsel to indigent defendants who had 
pleaded guilty to be unconstitutional.  See id.  However, the decision only pertained to the 
right to counsel, so as it stands, the right to postconviction remedies for those who plead 
guilty is still only by leave to appeal. 
96 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-1 (2011). 
97 Miguel v. State, 774 A.2d 19, 22 (R.I. 2001) (quoting State v. Dufresne, 436 A.2d 720, 
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The Pennsylvania postconviction statute contains a separate provision 
for those who plead guilty, which states that a petitioner for postconviction 
relief may show that her conviction resulted from “[a] plea of guilty 
unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the 
inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is 
innocent.”98  This provision is included in a list of several other potential 
subjects of postconviction petitions, which would appear to indicate that 
those who plead guilty are not limited to this type of petition.
99
  However, 
in Commonwealth v. Martinez, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated 
that “[a]fter a defendant has entered a plea of guilty the only cognizable 
issues in a [postconviction] proceeding are the validity of the plea of guilty 
and the legality of the sentence.”100 
3. The Role of Plea Agreements 
In several states, it is legal for defendants to waive their rights to 
postconviction remedies in their plea agreements.
101
  While it is unknown 
how many defendants in state court waive their postconviction rights, a 
2005 study found that in nearly two-thirds of federal cases settled by a plea 
agreement, defendants agreed to waive their rights to review.
102
  Missouri 
allows defendants to waive their rights to seek postconviction relief in 
return for reduced sentences if their records demonstrate that the defendants 
were properly informed of their rights and that the waivers were made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
103
  Arkansas allows defendants to 
waive any right to further appeal, postconviction relief, or an attorney as 
part of a plea bargain.
104
  In South Carolina, a capital defendant may waive 
postconviction rights as long as two prongs are met: (1) the defendant must 
be mentally competent and comprehend his circumstances (the “cognitive 
 
722 (R.I. 1981)). 
98 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9543 (2011). 
99 Id. (providing that a petitioner can assert via postconviction petition that his conviction 
or sentence resulted from one or more of the following: constitutional violations, ineffective 
assistance of counsel, obstruction of justice by government officials, or the unavailability of 
exculpatory evidence). 
100 Commonwealth v. Martinez, 539 A.2d 399, 401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). 
101 See DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2000); Willett v. State, 993 
S.W.2d 929 (Ark. 1999); State v. Valdez, 851 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); State v. 
Downs, 631 S.E.2d 79 (S.C. 2006). 
102 Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing 
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209 (2005). 
103 Jackson v. State, 241 S.W.3d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
104 Willett, 993 S.W.2d at 929–30. 
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prong”) and (2) the defendant must also have the ability to assist counsel or 
the court in identifying exculpatory or mitigating information (the 
“assistance prong”).105 
In contrast, several states prohibit the waiver of postconviction rights 
in plea agreements.  In Hood v. State, the Supreme Court of Nevada noted 
the important distinctions between appeal rights, which can be waived in a 
plea agreement, and postconviction rights: 
Post-conviction remedies differ significantly from a direct appeal.  Unlike a direct 
appeal, post-conviction proceedings collaterally attack the constitutional validity of 
the conviction, or the legality of continued confinement on a basis other than the 
manner in which the conviction was obtained.  It would be unconscionable for the 
state to attempt to insulate a conviction from collateral constitutional review by 
conditioning its willingness to enter into plea negotiations on a defendant’s waiver of 
the right to pursue post-conviction remedies.
106
 
Accordingly, the court held that postconviction rights can never be waived 
as part of a plea agreement.
107
  Similarly, Indiana courts have held that 
provisions in plea agreements in which defendants waive their rights to 
postconviction relief are void and unenforceable.
108
 
C. HABEAS CORPUS 
Federal habeas corpus review of state convictions has existed since 
1867, when the writ of habeas corpus was made available to state prisoners 
“in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in 
violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.”109  
The right to habeas corpus has long been considered a crucial constitutional 
right; it is taken seriously by the courts and is never to be suspended except 
in times of severe crisis.
110
  Federal habeas corpus provides a means by 
 
105 Downs, 631 S.E.2d at 85; Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53, 61 (S.C. 1993). 
106 Hood v. State, 890 P.2d 797, 798 (Nev. 1995). 
107 Id. 
108 Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065, 1067–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
109 Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.  Additionally, the Constitution itself 
prohibits suspension of the “Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, 
cl. 2.  Prior to the passage of this Act, state prisoners could only petition state courts for writs 
of habeas corpus, and the federal courts had no habeas corpus jurisdiction over state 
prisoners.  See Ex Parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845) (“Neither this nor any other 
court of the United States, or judge thereof, can issue a habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner, 
who is in custody under a sentence or execution of a state court, for any other purpose than 
to be used as a witness.”). 
110 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require 
it.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
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which state prisoners can challenge their state court convictions in federal 
courts.
111
  A federal habeas corpus petition may only be filed after a 




The most commonly used modern federal habeas corpus writ is the 
writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum used by prisoners seeking collateral 
review after the completion of their direct appeals and challenging the 
constitutionality of their convictions and sentences.
113
  Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254, convicted state prisoners may file motions to “vacate, set aside, or 
correct their sentences.”114  While state prisoners may access federal 
postconviction proceedings only after completion of direct appeal and 
habeas or other collateral proceedings in state court, federal prisoners may 
pursue postconviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after completion 
of direct appeal.
115
  This Comment does not address the scope of federal 
habeas corpus remedies, instead focusing solely on postconviction rights 
provided by state statutes. 
“State postconviction remedies . . . are the counterparts to federal 
habeas corpus statutes . . . .  They exist because of, and are modeled on or 
interpreted in light of, the federal statutes that allow relief to those in 
custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States.”116  Generally, 
state habeas corpus statutes exist to provide a means by which someone 
who believes he is being unlawfully committed, detained, confined, or 
restrained of his liberty may challenge his detention. 
State habeas corpus statutes are usually broad, allowing courts to 
review the reasons for detention and prevent abuses of power by the state.  
“Every state and the District of Columbia have procedures for collateral 
review through applications for writs of habeas corpus or a related remedy 
known as writs of error coram nobis.”117  While some states treat their 
habeas corpus statutes as their postconviction statutes,
118
 many states have 
 
111 See generally John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to 
Hoffmann and King, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 435 (2011). 
112 Id. at 442. 
113 Sara Rodriguez & Scott J. Atlas, Habeas Corpus: The Dilemma of Actual Innocence, 
34 LITIG. 35, 36 (2008). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Henry B. Robertson, The Needle in the Haystack: Towards a New State 
Postconviction Remedy, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 333 (1992). 
117 DONALD E. WILKES JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF HANDBOOK 
§ 1.3 (2006). 
118 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34.724 (LexisNexis 2010); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
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separate statutes for habeas corpus in addition to their general 
postconviction statutory schemes.
119
  Habeas corpus statutes do not 
distinguish between those who plead guilty and those who are convicted at 
trial, but state habeas corpus statutes differ in their applicability 
postconviction.  Some states expressly allow individuals to file habeas 
corpus petitions once they have been convicted, while others prohibit 
anyone from filing a habeas corpus petition to attack the final judgment of a 
criminal court.
120
  As one commentator noted: 
State habeas procedures, however, can be difficult.  In every jurisdiction, a well-
developed state court habeas corpus record and complete presentation of the claims 
for relief are required for post-conviction success.  States often impose short time 
limits after a prisoner’s conviction becomes final to commence habeas proceedings.  
Applicants cannot merely relitigate claims that could have been raised on direct 
appeal.  The range of available claims is limited, and, often, the source of such claims 
depends on information outside the trial record.
121
 
Due to the complexity and vast variations among state habeas corpus 
statutes, this Comment does not analyze state habeas corpus statutes beyond 




arts. 11.01, 11.07 (West 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 53-4A-1 (LexisNexis 2012). 
119 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4121–4122 (2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 
(West 2002); GA. CODE ANN., § 9-14-1 (West 2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-102 
(LexisNexis 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-25.5-1-1 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 589.01 
(West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2801 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-27-1 (2004); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-21-101 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.36.010 (West 2011). 
120 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4310 (West 2006) (“An action for habeas 
corpus to inquire into the cause of detention may not be brought by or on behalf of . . . (3) 
[p]ersons convicted, or in execution, upon legal process, civil or criminal.”); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 11-43-3 (2003) (“This chapter shall not apply to any collateral relief sought by any 
person following his conviction of a crime.  Such relief shall be governed by the procedures 
prescribed in the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act.”); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 29-2801 (2009) (providing that any person, “except persons convicted of some 
crime or offense for which they stand committed,” who is confined in jail or unlawfully 
deprived of his or her liberty may apply for a writ of habeas corpus); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2A:67-14 (West 2005) (providing that “[a]ny person committed or restrained of his liberty 
by virtue of a final judgment of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction or by 
virtue of any process issued pursuant thereto” “shall not be entitled to prosecute writ of 
habeas corpus”).  But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-22-101 (2011) (“The writ of habeas corpus 
is not available to attack the validity of the conviction or sentence of a person who has been 
adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record and has exhausted the remedy of appeal.”), 
invalidated by Lott v. State, 150 P.3d 337, 342 (Mont. 2006) (“In light of the writ’s history 
and purpose, as well as Montana’s constitutional guarantee . . . that the writ of habeas corpus 
shall never be suspended, we conclude that, as applied to a facially invalid sentence . . . the 
procedural bar created by § 46-22-101(2), MCA, unconstitutionally suspends the writ.”). 
121 Robertson, supra note 116, at 333. 
122 For more information regarding state and federal habeas corpus procedures and 
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III. DISCUSSION 
Based on an overview of the postconviction remedies available to 
those who plead guilty, it is clear that there is much variation and ambiguity 
among the states.  While the purposes of postconviction remedies are to 
ensure that innocent people are not wrongfully convicted and to prevent 
constitutional violations from going without remedy, the lack of 
consistency and clarity in these statutes is directly contrary to this goal.  As 
I argue below, the current system of postconviction remedies in most states 
is patently unjust to defendants who plead guilty.  First, any distinction in 
postconviction rights between those who plead guilty and those who are 
convicted at trial is based on a faulty assumption—either that innocent 
defendants do not plead guilty or that those who plead guilty have not been 
subjected to constitutional violations.  Second, limiting postconviction 
rights for those who plead guilty is at odds with the purposes underlying a 
general system of postconviction remedies.  Finally, the lack of clarity in 
the laws leads to inconsistent results, denying many deserving petitioners 
their rights. 
A. INNOCENT PEOPLE PLEAD GUILTY 
Any distinction in postconviction remedies between those who plead 
guilty and those convicted at trial is based either on the assumption that 
innocent people do not plead guilty or on the assumption that constitutional 
violations do not occur during the plea-bargaining process.  However, there 
is much research demonstrating that innocent people do plead guilty; nearly 
10% of the first 300 postconviction exonerations were of people who had 
pleaded guilty.
123
  “The factors that give rise to wrongful convictions have 
been described with some clarity, and include mistaken eyewitness 
identification, erroneous forensic science, coerced confessions, police or 
prosecutorial misconduct, use of untruthful informants or other witnesses, 
and inadequate or incompetent legal assistance”;124 the same factors can be 
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124 Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 452 
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present regardless of whether a defendant goes to trial or pleads guilty. 
People may choose to plead guilty to something they did not do for 
many reasons, including: they lack compelling evidence demonstrating their 
innocence, they falsely confessed and the confession will be used against 
them at trial, they received a more lenient sentence as a result of the plea 
deal, their defense attorney or a prosecutor pressured them into it, they are 
vulnerable or mentally handicapped, or they feel that they have no other 
choice.
125
  In addition, an innocent person may actually believe that he is 
guilty.  He may be confused as to his prior actions, fail to understand that 
criminal liability requires both an act or omission and intent, be unable to 
understand that both the act and intent must be considered criminal, fail to 
understand that there is no crime unless the act and intent concur, fail to 




Aside from evidentiary concerns, mistakes, or misconduct, innocent 
defendants may also feel compelled to plead guilty due to some of the 
benefits involved.  “On balance, plea bargaining is a categorical good for 
many innocent defendants, particularly in low-stakes cases,”127 but “even 
for innocent defendants facing more serious charges, plea bargaining may 
be, at a minimum, the manifestly least-bad option.”128  Innocent defendants 
often have incentives to plead guilty because they wish to avoid long 
sentences or death sentences that would result from being convicted at trial 
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.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). 
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for crimes they did not commit.
129
  Studies have shown that defendants who 
maintain their innocence, go to trial, and are found guilty are often given 
longer sentences because they are viewed as unremorseful, so defendants 
may wish to avoid the possibility of being penalized for going to trial by 
taking a lesser sentence through a plea bargain.
130
 
Some attorneys even believe that it is advantageous for innocent 
defendants to plead guilty.  As one Chicago attorney stated: 
A lawyer’s function is simply to minimize the painful consequences of criminal 
proceedings for his client.  If, for example, I get an offer of probation in a felony case, 
I jump at it.  It doesn’t matter whether the client tells me he is innocent, whether I 
believe him, or even whether I’m 90 percent sure of an acquittal.  So long as there is a 
10 percent chance of a prison sentence, the client is better off to plead.
131
 
In the same study, other attorneys reported that “although they usually 
refuse to permit ‘innocent’ defendants to plead guilty, they sometimes made 
exceptions when prosecutorial offers were unusually generous or unusually 
coercive.”132  One public defender even stated that sometimes the attorneys 
in his office “decide that they are going to save themselves and the state a 
trial” and “put intolerable pressure on a defendant” to plead guilty.133 
Before a defendant may plead guilty, the court must establish a factual 
basis for the guilty plea, a process that involves “determining what acts and 
intent can be attributed to the defendant.  If the acts and intent uncovered 
through the accuracy inquiry correspond to the elements of the crime to 
which the plea is offered, a ‘factual basis’ for the plea is said to exist.”134  In 
practice, this requirement is often insufficient to prevent innocent people 
from pleading guilty.
135
  For example, some judges disregard the 
importance of this requirement and do not diligently ensure that it is met.  A 
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133 Id. at 1285. 
134 Barkai, supra note 126, at 95 n.35. 
135 See generally Steven Schmidt, The Need for Review: Allowing Defendants to Appeal 
the Factual Basis of a Conviction After Pleading Guilty, 95 MINN. L. REV. 284 (2010). 
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survey of Indiana state trial court judges revealed that the state’s lack of 
process requirements for factual basis inquiries led judges to “abdicate . . . 
their responsibility to ensure that a plea of guilty is voluntarily made with 
full appreciation of the consequences of the action.”136  Another study 
revealed that “judges often neglect the factual basis requirement and that 
questions during pretrial tend to focus on the appropriate sentence rather 
than on the factual basis for the plea.”137 
Some experts have argued that the factual basis requirement is 
“relatively unimportant” and “more form than substance.”138  Prosecutors 
also play a role in this process: “Many commentators have noted that the 
government’s principal goals in plea bargaining are efficiency and 
obtaining convictions, as opposed to justice and fairness.”139  Prosecutors 
often hope to secure guilty pleas quickly, “regardless of the factual realities 
of a case.”140  Other factors can also contribute to the unfairness of the plea-
bargaining process and cause innocent people to plead guilty, such as racial 
disparities and biases and ineffective assistance of counsel.
141
 
While many have argued that innocent people plead guilty more often 
than we think, some have argued that innocent people do not plead guilty at 
all, or that the problem is not big enough to truly worry about.
142
  While it is 
impossible to know just how many people who plead guilty are actually 
innocent, anecdotal evidence demonstrates that innocent people often feel 
compelling pressure to plead guilty.  For example, Marcellius Bradford 
 
136 Earl G. Penrod, The Guilty Plea Process in Indiana: A Proposal to Strengthen the 
Diminishing Factual Basis Requirement, 34 IND. L. REV. 1127, 1138–43 (2001). 
137 Schmidt, supra note 135, at 307 (citing Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation 
in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 256 (2006)) (internal 
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BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 191–93 (2002)). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. (citing Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of 
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It?, CRIM. JUST. MAG., Fall 2008, at 28, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
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authcheckdam.pdf (“Although commentators have long argued and explained why innocents 
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served more than six years in Illinois prison for a murder he did not commit 
after he pleaded guilty and testified against his codefendants in exchange 
for a twelve-year sentence.  Bradford later said he was threatened with a life 
sentence and coerced to plead guilty and testify.  Ultimately, DNA testing 
exonerated Bradford and his codefendants and implicated the two men who 
actually committed the crime.
143
 
Christopher Ochoa falsely confessed and pleaded guilty to a murder 
that he did not commit.
144
  He later recalled his lawyers pressuring him to 
plead guilty: 
[They told] him that his detailed confession to a rape and murder was so compelling 
that he might receive the death penalty.  They told him there was “no way an innocent 
person would give such a detailed statement.”  He later said that although his lawyers 
probably “believed [he] was guilty,” he also had the impression that “it was less 
work” for them if he would plead guilty.  He was offered a life sentence for his 
testimony against his also-innocent codefendant, Richard Danziger.
145
 
 Studies have documented the main causes of false confessions, 
including duress, coercion, intoxication, diminished capacity, mental 
impairment, ignorance of the law, fear of violence, the actual infliction of 
harm, the threat of a harsh sentence, and misunderstanding the sentence.
146
  
“Psychological studies of confessions that have proved false show 
overrepresentation of children, the mentally ill and mentally retarded, and 
suspects who are drunk or high.  They are susceptible to suggestion, eager 
to please authority figures, disconnected from reality or unable to defer 
gratification.”147  Police officers are also trained to incorporate highly 
coercive psychological interrogation tactics, such as implying leniency, 
reducing moral responsibility by blaming peer pressure, pretending to have 
evidence, and lying to suspects.
148
  According to the Innocence Project, 
false confessions have played a role in 24% of the convictions that have 
later been reversed by DNA evidence.
149
   
Some commentators argue that this issue could be better addressed by 
stricter enforcement of the factual basis requirements.
150
  While that would 
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certainly help to reduce the number of innocent people who plead guilty, it 
is not the only solution to the problem.  Undoubtedly, even with more 
stringent factual basis requirements, those who are innocent would still feel 
compelled to plead guilty.  In addition, this could actually be worse for 
innocent people; because sentences imposed after trial are often longer than 
those attached to guilty pleas, forcing innocent people to go to trial could 
result in even more innocent people being in jail.  Further, even with strict 
enforcement of factual basis requirements, other constitutional violations 
may occur that would merit redress in postconviction proceedings. 
B. LIMITING POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES FOR THOSE WHO 
PLEAD GUILTY IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF 
OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE PURPOSES OF 
POSTCONVICTION STATUTES 
English jurist William Blackstone wrote in the 1760s that it is “better 
that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”151  This 
ideology underscores our criminal justice system; the Supreme Court has 
stated that the “ultimate objective” of our justice system is “that the guilty 
be convicted and the innocent go free.”152  That the government should not 
allow an innocent person to plead guilty to a crime he did not commit is one 
of the basic principles of the U.S. criminal justice system.
153
  Connecting 
these principles to the postconviction context, Justice Marshall stated that 
“[h]abeas corpus and civil rights actions are of ‘fundamental importance . . . 
in our constitutional scheme’ because they directly protect our most valued 
rights.”154 
Postconviction remedies were created with this principle in mind.  The 
first exoneration through the use of DNA testing occurred in 1989, drawing 
attention to the national problem of wrongful convictions.
155
  As a result of 
the increasing number of wrongful convictions and exonerations that have 
come to light in recent years, numerous states have recognized the 
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importance of providing convicted defendants avenues by which to assert or 
demonstrate their actual innocence and challenge their convictions.  For 
example, in 2010, the Ohio legislature passed Senate Bill 77, “one of the 
nation’s most comprehensive criminal justice reform packages.”156  The bill 
was a package of “sweeping reforms” designed to prevent wrongful 
convictions and overturn injustices.
157
  Ohio Representative Tyrone Yates, 
the bill’s sponsor in the House of Representatives, called the bill “one of the 
most important pieces of criminal justice legislation in [the] state in a 
century.”158  Another Representative, Bill Coley, called the bill a 
“tremendous tool for fighting crime” and stated that “[n]one of us in this 
state benefit when a wrongly convicted person sits in prison.”159  However, 
despite these concerns, the Ohio postconviction statutes do not explicitly 
include those who plead guilty, and Ohio’s forensic testing statute explicitly 
excludes those who plead guilty.
160
 
When the Illinois legislature originally passed its postconviction 
forensic testing statute, state representatives discussed the purpose and 
goals of the statute.
161
  The bill’s sponsor, Peter Roskam, stated, “[I]n my 
opinion, this Bill is about doing the right thing.  Nobody wants the wrong 
person behind bars.  Because if the wrong person is behind bars, that means 
that there’s a bad person who’s out there, who’s gotten off scot-free.”162  
Another representative, Barbara Flynn Currie, stated in support of the bill: 
This is a simple issue of basic justice.  The prospect of people doing time for crimes 
they didn’t commit is one that, I should think, would make each of us, and our 
constituents, shudder.  We have had examples, not just from DNA evidence, but also 
from issues like automated fingerprint identification systems, new technology that can 
determine whether or not the person who was convicted, in fact, committed the crime.  
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And I think it would be distressing to the folks back home to think that we are not 
concerned enough about that possibility that we provide a clear channel, a clear 
avenue in the law for someone to reraise that basic issue . . . .  It is only about fair play 
and justice.  It’s only about making sure that the innocent do go free.
163
 
Despite these noble intentions, Illinois currently does not allow those who 
plead guilty to petition for DNA or forensic testing.
164
  While the Illinois 
and Ohio representatives were clearly concerned with fairness and the 
administration of justice, they neglected to include in their postconviction 
statutes individuals who plead guilty, who can be just as innocent as those 
who go to trial. 
Many have argued that state interests in finality and efficiency run 
counter to allowing those who plead guilty to later challenge their 
convictions.
165
  “Prosecutors have sought to narrowly constrain the 
availability of postconviction DNA testing, citing financial concerns, the 
need for finality in the criminal justice system, the need to protect the 
system of plea bargaining, and the specter of a wave of frivolous 
requests.”166  According to one scholar, finality is an “essential part of the 
prosecutor’s bargain,” and “the finality of a plea-bargained case is the 
indispensable element of the plea bargain itself.”167  This author goes on to 
argue that to alter the terms of “finality” in the plea-bargaining context 
would “rewrite the main purpose of the agreement after the fact” and have 
“major, largely unforeseeable ramifications upon the system.”168  However, 
the need for justice and truth outweighs the government’s interest in 
finality; “[i]f verdicts were taken as absolutely final, then our law would be 
a ‘pretender to absolute truth.’”169  One expert noted:  
Postconviction relief assumes by its very existence that finality and comity will be set 
aside in the appropriate case.  The goal is to identify that case, not to balance interests 
for the sake of achieving some politically expedient consensus.  Taken to their logical 
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While finality may be a highly compelling interest in other areas of law, 
when an innocent person’s liberty is at stake, other interests are more 
important.  In addition, allowing broader access to postconviction remedies 
may actually increase the sense of finality; recent studies suggest that 
posttrial DNA testing has more often resulted in confirming the defendant’s 
guilt than in proving his innocence.
171
 
Some have also argued that letting defendants plead guilty in exchange 
for the benefit of reduced sentences and then later use state resources to 
contest their sentences would encourage guilty defendants to game the 
system and attempt to get out on technicalities.
172
  However, any convicted 
defendant, whether guilty or innocent, will always have incentives to appeal 
a conviction.  Also, the likelihood of success in postconviction proceedings 
is very slim and requires a petitioner to meet a high burden of proof.  For 
example, as one commentator notes: 
DNA is effective proof of innocence only in a limited category of cases.  Only where 
biological material can be unequivocally attributed to the perpetrator of a crime and 
where the suspect can be excluded as the donor of the biological material is the DNA 
evidence “proof” of innocence.  This is likely to be the case only in sex crimes or in 
cases in which the criminal actor—and only the criminal actor—has left biological 
material at the site of a crime.  Many crimes—even crimes of violence—include no 
such evidence.  In a wide variety of cases, then, DNA evidence cannot dispositively 
rule out a potential suspect.
173
 
Because there is already such a high burden of proof and slim 
likelihood of success in postconviction proceedings, the fear that expanding 
postconviction rights to those who plead guilty will lead to actually guilty 
defendants escaping liability is simply unwarranted.  Many states have 
already put safeguards in place to address this issue, as well as concerns 
about costs, either by requiring a defendant to cover the costs of DNA 
testing himself
174
 or by requiring a petitioner to show that a favorable result 
from the DNA testing would be likely to change the result on retrial or 
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demonstrate the petitioner’s actual innocence.175 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the Dixmoor Five and Englewood Four examples from the 
Introduction demonstrate,
176
 lack of clarity in state postconviction statutes 
leads to inconsistent results in the courts.  While in the case of the Dixmoor 
Five, the judge ruled that those who plead guilty are meant to be excluded 
from postconviction remedies, in the very similar Englewood Four case, the 
judge ruled that those who plead guilty are not barred from bringing 
postconviction petitions based on newly discovered evidence.
177
  State 
statutes governing postconviction remedies should be made clearer in order 
to prevent confusion in the courts, and states that do not already grant 
defendants who plead guilty explicit access to postconviction remedies 
should amend their statutes to do so. 
DNA or other forensic evidence that excludes a defendant is one of the 
most powerful forms of evidence of innocence, yet in several states people 
who plead guilty are denied access to this evidence.  Again, the Dixmoor 
Five and Englewood Four cases in Illinois provide a powerful example of 
how denying defendants who plead guilty access to DNA testing is contrary 
to the interests of justice.  In Illinois, individuals who plead guilty are 
barred from later seeking DNA testing, but those who are convicted at trial 
are eligible to file a motion for DNA testing.
178
  In both the Dixmoor Five 
and Englewood Four cases, several of the defendants were convicted by a 
jury at trial.
179
  As such, the codefendants who did not plead guilty were 
eligible to file a motion for DNA testing on the evidence, which they 
ultimately did.  The results of the DNA tests came back as not only 
excluding all of the codefendants who were originally convicted in each 
case, but also as matching a convicted criminal.  Fortunately for those who 
pleaded guilty, they had codefendants who had proceeded to trial and were 
thus eligible to have the testing done, but what about cases where there are 
no codefendants? 
To prevent this kind of inconsistency and arbitrary line-drawing, state 
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statutes should explicitly allow all defendants, including those who plead 
guilty, the ability to petition courts for postconviction DNA testing.  
Concerns about costs can be alleviated by requiring defendants who can 
afford it to pay for the costs of testing and by limiting testing to cases where 
the results of testing would be materially relevant to determining who 
committed the crime.  To prevent defendants from “manipulating the 
system,” postconviction DNA statutes may require defendants to show “[a] 
reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have been convicted or 
would have received a lesser sentence if favorable results had been obtained 
through DNA testing at the time of the original prosecution”180 as a 
prerequisite to testing. 
The absurdity of the distinction between those who plead guilty and 
those convicted at trial is further demonstrated by the Illinois courts’ 
inconsistent application of the postconviction statute.  Once the DNA hit to 
a convicted sex offender came back, all five of the Dixmoor codefendants 
had been proven equally innocent.  However, based on one judge’s 
construction of the applicable statute, individuals who plead guilty would 
not have access to the proceedings by which those convicted at trial may 
move to have their convictions vacated.  To vacate only the convictions of 
those who went to trial, but to let stand the convictions of the codefendants 
who pleaded guilty makes absolutely no sense; any statutory interpretation 
that would compel this result cannot be valid. 
In addition to allowing defendants who plead guilty to use statutory 
postconviction remedies, it should be impermissible for defendants who 
plead guilty to waive their postconviction rights in plea agreements.  As 
several states have recognized, there are serious problems with the practice 
of allowing defendants who plead guilty to waive these rights.  
Postconviction remedies are generally the only avenue available for 
defendants to raise constitutional violations from their initial criminal 
proceedings, and to allow defendants to waive these rights would be to let 
constitutional violations on the part of defense attorneys, prosecutors, 
judges, and other government officials go unnoticed and without remedy. 
In 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder reversed a Bush Administration 
policy under which federal prosecutors were allowed to seek waivers of 
DNA testing rights from defendants who plead guilty.
181
  At the time, 
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defense lawyers stated that under the previous policy, their clients were 
“essentially forced to sign the waivers or lose the benefits of a plea 
agreement, such as a lighter sentence.”182  In reversing the policy, Attorney 
General Holder emphasized that “DNA evidence is one of the most 
powerful tools available to the criminal justice system, and these new steps 
will ensure the department can use DNA to the greatest extent possible to 
solve crimes and ensure the guilty are convicted.”183  In response to this 
change, Peter Neufeld, cofounder of the Innocence Project, stated, “It never 
made any sense to force people, as a condition of a plea, to give up their 
right to future DNA testing, particularly since we know that factually 
innocent people plead guilty.”184 
Beyond DNA-testing waivers, in Hood v. State, the Supreme Court of 
Nevada noted the potential consequences of allowing defendants to waive 
their constitutional postconviction rights in plea agreements.  In holding 
that “[i]t would be unconscionable for the state to attempt to insulate a 
conviction from collateral constitutional review by conditioning its 
willingness to enter into plea negotiations on a defendant’s waiver of the 
right to pursue postconviction remedies,” the court stated that: 
If postconviction remedies could be waived, the state could prevent a defendant from 
challenging an involuntary guilty plea or a conviction entered without jurisdiction.  
Although we do not suggest that the state would act in bad faith in obtaining 
convictions, we must recognize that it has been a historical function of the courts to 
construe the legal limits of prosecution under statutory and constitutional law.  On 
occasion, it has been necessary for the courts to curb prosecutorial abuses, or to 
construe the law in a manner inconsistent with the views of prosecutorial authorities.  
These judicial functions would be impaired, and the lack of judicial review could raise 
doubts concerning the constitutional validity of criminal judgments.
185
 
In addition, allowing defendants to waive their rights to postconviction 
remedies in plea agreements presents a dangerous and unacceptable conflict 
of interest for defense attorneys.  Ineffectiveness of defense counsel is a 
claim that can generally only be raised postconviction, so defense attorneys 
have an added incentive to encourage their clients to take plea agreements 
in which they waive their postconviction rights.  A publication issued by the 
American Bar Association noted that “these waivers work to insulate the 
plea and government and defense counsel’s respective actions from any 
review.  Importantly, ethics bodies in five of six jurisdictions, which have 





185 Hood v. State, 890 P.2d 797, 798 (Nev. 1995). 
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assistance of counsel claims from the scope of permissible postconviction 
waivers.”186  This exact problem was noted in Chaney v. State, where at a 
change of plea hearing the plea counsel stated as follows: 
Judge, actually I’d like to make a record as to the waiver of the post-conviction 
rights . . . .  [I]t is the position of the Public Defender’s Office that it would be a 
conflict of interest for me to advise [my client] to waive his post-conviction rights 
because one of the prongs of that is effective assistance of counsel and it puts me in a 




Despite this valid concern, the court went on to allow the defendant to 
waive his postconviction rights, stating that as long as the waiver is made 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, it is valid.
188
  However, to 
eliminate conflicts of interest and preserve defendants’ rights to 
constitutional review of their plea attorneys’ performances, this type of 
waiver should not be permitted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We know that innocent people plead guilty to crimes they did not 
commit, yet the statutes governing postconviction relief for those who plead 
guilty are varied and unclear.  As a result, the postconviction remedies 
available to those who plead guilty yet assert their innocence are currently 
inadequate to ensure that innocent people do not serve time for crimes they 
did not commit.  Some states explicitly include those who plead guilty in 
their postconviction statutes and grant them access to DNA testing, 
postconviction petitions, or habeas corpus petitions.  Some states explicitly 
exclude those who plead guilty from their postconviction statutes, denying 
them the opportunity to have DNA testing performed on evidence from 
their cases, denying them access to the courts, or denying them the 
opportunity to file habeas corpus petitions. 
However, most states do not explicitly include or exclude those who 
plead guilty in their postconviction statutes, instead leaving it to the courts 
to decide whether those who plead guilty can later seek DNA testing or 
challenge their convictions.  Some state courts have decided to include 
those who plead guilty, some have decided to exclude them, and others 
have decided to limit their rights and the situations in which those who 
 
186 Alan Ellis & Todd Bussert, Stemming the Tide of Postconviction Waivers, CRIM. JUST. 
MAG., Spring 2010, at 28, available at http://www.alanellis.com/CM/Publications/ 
Steamming_the%20_Tide.pdf. 
187 Chaney v. State, 323 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
188 Id. at 840. 
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plead guilty can access the courts or forensic testing.  Further, some states 
allow those who plead guilty to waive their postconviction rights in plea 
agreements, forfeiting the opportunity to have a court review the processes 
by which they were convicted. 
As the law currently stands, most state laws do not adequately address 
either the issue of wrongful convictions of those who plead guilty or that of 
constitutional violations in the context of guilty pleas.  In order to remedy 
this situation, state statutes should be amended specifically to include those 
who plead guilty, thereby eliminating any confusion or inconsistency in the 
courts.  This is the only way to ensure that everyone’s constitutional rights 
are protected, as we know that the same issues that lead to wrongful 
convictions at trial also lead to wrongful convictions through guilty pleas. 
In addition, postconviction DNA testing statutes should not distinguish 
between those who plead guilty and those convicted at trial.  Most states 
have passed postconviction DNA testing laws because of an interest in 
determining with as much certainty as possible whether the person who was 
convicted of a crime is the person who actually committed the crime.  This 
question is still present in cases where someone pleads guilty.  In most 
states, petitioners are responsible for bearing the costs of postconviction 
DNA testing, so expanding this right to include those who plead guilty 
would not be an added burden on state resources.  In the interests of justice 
and certainty, all people, including those who plead guilty, should be given 
access to postconviction DNA or other forensic testing if the results of the 
testing would be materially relevant to determining who committed the 
crime. 
Finally, all states should pass statutes prohibiting defendants from 
waiving their postconviction rights during the plea-bargaining process.  
Allowing defendants to waive their postconviction rights effectively 
insulates the process by which pleas are taken from ever being reexamined 
and opens the door for law enforcement and prosecutorial misconduct to 
occur and go without remedy.  In addition, allowing defendants to waive 
their postconviction rights, including the right to allege ineffective 
assistance of counsel, creates perverse incentives for defense attorneys who 
counsel their clients on whether or not to accept a plea deal.  These issues 
compromise the integrity of the criminal process and undoubtedly lead to 
injustice. 
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